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Are Rules of Inference Superfluous?  






En el Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argumenta que la justificación inferencial depen-
de solo de la comprensión de las premisas y la conclusión y no está mediada por ningún 
otro acto adicional. Tomando lo anterior como base, Wittgenstein defiende que las reglas 
de inferencia de Frege y Russell “carecen de sentido” y son “superfluas”. Esta línea de 
argumento es problemática, puesto que no está claro que pueda haber una explicación 
viable de la inferencia de acuerdo con la cual no haya tal mediación. Muestro que el re-
chazo por parte de Wittgenstein de las reglas de inferencia puede estar motivado si se tie-
ne en cuenta su interpretación holista de la relación entre inferencia y comprensión. 
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ABSTRACT 
In Tractatus 5.132 Wittgenstein argues that inferential justification depends solely 
on the understanding of the premises and conclusion, and is not mediated by any further 
act. On this basis he argues that Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference are “senseless” 
and “superfluous”. This line of argument is puzzling, since it is unclear that there could 
be any viable account of inference according to which no such mediation takes place. I 
show that Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference can be motivated by taking ac-
count of his holistic construal of the relation between inference and understanding. 
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In paragraph 5.132 of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus Wittgenstein 
argues that inferential justification depends solely on the understanding of 
the premises and conclusions, and is not mediated by any further act or 
state [Wittgenstein (1960), henceforth TLP]. On this basis he goes on to 
reject what he calls Frege’s and Russell’s “laws of inference” (Schlussgesetze), 
a term which, as I will argue below, refers to the rules of inference of their 
systems. These, he says, “are senseless and would be superfluous”. This 
line of argument is puzzling, however, for it is far from clear that there 
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could be any viable account of the justificatory nature of inference in 
which no such mediation takes place. What seems to make inference into a 
form of justification (by contrast to the mere association of thoughts) is 
that we draw the conclusion in light of our recognition of the goodness of 
the inferential connection. Indeed, Frege acknowledges this in saying that 
to infer is “to make a judgment because we are cognisant of other truths as 
providing a justification for it” [Frege (1979), p. 3] and Russell acknowl-
edges this in saying that in inferring, the applicability of the rule “must be 
simply perceived.” [Russell (1903), p. 41].1  
Both Frege and Russell construe the logical mediation of premises 
and conclusion in terms of the application of rules of inference. Further-
more, in spelling out the role of such rules Frege and Russell are careful to 
distinguish it from the contribution made by adding a further premise to 
the inference. Frege says that rules such as modus ponens cannot be ex-
pressed in his logical system “because they form its basis” [Frege (1972), p. 
136], and Russell says that the rule of inference “eludes formal statement” 
[Russell (1903), p. 34]. They thus seem to treat the rules of inference in 
terms of what we might nowadays call the meta-language of their systems; 
and the advantage in doing so is that it allows them to avoid the regress 
which, as pointed out by Lewis Carroll, threatens the idea that inferential 
justification depends on the appreciation of validity [Carroll (1895)]. To 
simplify somewhat, Carroll shows that if the appreciation of validity had to 
be codified as a premise that is added to the inference – if the inference 
would not be fully justified otherwise – the form of the original inference 
would thereby be altered, and a further demand for justification would then 
arise with respect to the new inferential sequence. Moreover, if the appreci-
ation of the validity of the new inference had to be codified as a premise as 
well, a further, as yet unjustified inferential sequence would emerge, and 
there would be no stopping this regress. But since rules of inference in Fre-
ge’s and Russell’s accounts capture the appreciation of validity without add-
ing such idle premises, they seem to account for inferential justification 
without giving rise to the regress. Indeed this is why Frege’s and Russell’s in-
expressible rules of inference do not seem to be senseless and superfluous. 
What, then, is the point of Wittgenstein’s critique? As I understand 
him, and contrary to the existing literature on the topic, Wittgenstein 
does not mean to reiterate Carroll’s objection, but he does mean to criti-
cize Frege’s and Russell’s appeal to rules of inference, for different rea-
sons. Wittgenstein rejects the idea that the goodness of an inference is 
some content which is to be cognized or a fact which must be perceived. 
As he sees it, Frege and Russell take the rules of inference to justify in-
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ferences by bringing such substantive content to bear on the premises 
and conclusion — content that would not otherwise be there. But Witt-
genstein rejects the idea that logic is a source of substantive content, let 
alone inexpressible content; moreover he rejects the idea that the com-
ponents of inference – the premises and conclusion – are discretely indi-
viduated atoms of thought, which only form logical connections with 
one another when some such additional content is appealed to. Instead, 
he locates inference within the holistic context of meaning, understanding 
and reasoning: the appreciation of logical relations is internal to the signifi-
cant use of signs, and does not need to be introduced by means of a sepa-
rate act, be it the act of adding a premise or the act of applying a rule.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. I begin by clearing up the 
target of Wittgenstein’s critique, showing that it is the rules of inference 
of Frege’s and Russell’s logical systems that TLP 5.132 rejects. In Section 
II I go on to explain what precisely Wittgenstein finds to be problematic 
in Frege’s and Russell’s articulations of the role of rules of inference. In 
Section III I discuss Wittgenstein’s approach to reasoning, and the holis-
tic context in which he locates inference, understanding and meaning. In 
Section IV I consider how Wittgenstein’s rejection of rules of inference 
reflects his general understanding of the relation between logic and 
thought, and in particular how it relates to his claim that inferential rela-
tions show themselves in propositions, but cannot be said by them. I argue 
that this claim does not commit Wittgenstein to the idea of inexpressible 
content which he criticizes Frege and Russell for endorsing.  
 
 
I. WHAT ARE SCHLUSSGESETZE? 
 
To begin with, let us consider the precise shape taken by Wittgen-
stein’s critique of Frege’s and Russell’s conceptions of inference: 
 
If p follows from q, I can infer from q to p; derive p from q.  
The mode of inference is to be understood from the two propositions alone. 
Only they themselves can justify the inference.  
‘Laws of inference,’ [‘Schlußgesetze’] which—as in the works of Frege and 
Russell—are supposed to justify inferences, are senseless, and would be 
superfluous. [TLP 5.132, translation emended].  
 
Wittgenstein starts from the premise that all we need in order to justify 
an inference is an understanding of the premises and conclusion, and 
proceeds to the claim that the appeal to “laws of inference” would be 
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“senseless” and “superfluous.” But the term “Laws of inference” (Schlußge-
setze) is not used as a technical term by either Frege or Russell. It might be 
taken to refer either to what Frege and Russell call the “basic laws” and 
“principles” (i.e. the axioms) of their systems, or to what they call the 
“rules” that govern proofs conducted in those systems. Russell, in particu-
lar, often fails to maintain a clear terminological distinction with respect to 
these two notions, and Frege is not always careful in this regard either. 
One reason to read ‘Schlußgesetze’ as specifically denoting rules, how-
ever, is that the second sentence of 5.132 employs a distinctively Fregean 
term – ‘mode of inference’ (Art des Schlusses) – which Frege uses in Be-
griffsschrift to refer to the single rule of inference of that system, modus po-
nens. Indeed, a common reading of 5.132, which I will henceforth refer 
to as the standard interpretation, takes Frege’s and Russell’s rules of in-
ference to be Wittgenstein’s target. Many standard interpreters of 5.132 
take Wittgenstein’s reasons for objecting to their rules of inference to co-
incide with the worry raised by Lewis Carroll [e.g. Mounce (1981), p. 
44f., Kenny (2006), p. 78, Baker (1988), p. 130f.] But it is, as I pointed 
out, far from clear that Frege’s and Russell’s construals of inference are 
vulnerable to Carroll’s regress. Since Frege and Russell deny that the 
rules can be encoded as propositions of the language that they govern, 
appealing to such rules does not result in adding premises to the infer-
ence, and so it does not lead to the regress.3 These standard interpreters 
thus have Wittgenstein attacking a straw man. 
This has given rise to various non-standard interpretations of 5.132. 
Ian Hacking holds that Wittgenstein would be right to criticize Russell, 
since the latter seems to lack a proper distinction between rules of infer-
ence and axioms and hence to be vulnerable to Carroll’s regress. But 
such criticism would fail to gain traction against the more careful treatment 
of rules in Frege [Hacking (1979), p. 290]. Seeking a more plausible reading 
of Wittgenstein – one that would show him to be a charitable reader of 
Frege, and yet show his criticism to be justifiable – Thomas Ricketts sug-
gests that at 5.132, Wittgenstein has two separate targets in view [Ricketts 
(1985)]. Drawing on the ambiguity of the term ‘Schlussgesetze,’ Ricketts ar-
gues that 5.132 can be read as separately targeting two issues: Russell’s 
rules of inference are criticized along the lines suggested by Carroll, and 
Frege is criticized for holding that an appeal to logical axioms is required 
in order to justify any proof.4 Ricketts has in mind the fact that according 
to Frege, in order to provide a gapless proof of a conclusion q from a 
premise p, we must first establish the conditional p⊃q and then derive q 
by modus ponens; the conditional must be established by showing it to be 
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an instance of a logical theorem, which in turn can be derived from the 
axioms of the system. Every Fregean proof is thus grounded in the axi-
oms. Indeed this might be the reason why Frege sometimes calls his axi-
oms “the laws of all inferring” [Frege (1984c), pp. 283-4]; Russell similarly 
says of his axioms that they are the “principles of inference” [Russell 
(1903), p.16]. But Wittgenstein, Ricketts notes, rejects the idea that to de-
rive one proposition from we must go all the way back to the axioms [cf. 
TLP 5.131, 6.127]. Ian Proops suggests a different non-standard interpre-
tation [Proops (2001)]. As he points out, Russell’s account of inference, 
read charitably, is no less immune to Carroll’s regress than Frege’s. Proops 
concludes that neither Frege’s nor Russell’s accounts of rules of inference 
should be taken to be the target of 5.132; in both cases, Proops holds, what 
is at stake must be the role played by the axioms.5 
I accept the point made by the non-standard interpretation that 
Wittgenstein’s criticism in 5.132 cannot be charitably read as applying 
Carroll’s original objection to Frege’s or to Russell’s conceptions of in-
ference. But against the non-standard reading, I do not assume that 
Frege’s or Russell’s conception of the rules of inference cannot be criti-
cized on other grounds.6 I also do not wish to deny that Wittgenstein 
elsewhere objects to Frege’s and Russell’s idea that any logical proof ul-
timately depends on an appeal to logical axioms. But this is compatible 
with reading 5.132 as rejecting Frege’s and Russell’s rules of inference. 
Furthermore, the critique of rules of inference that I attribute to Witt-
genstein is compatible with the fact that he elsewhere recognizes the 
practical usefulness of rule-governed formal calculi, which may facilitate 
the recognition of logical connections in certain cases. But this does not 
mean that he thinks that when we infer we apply a rule-governed calcu-
lus to our thoughts; Wittgenstein in fact denies that the process modeled 
by rule-governed proof is essential to logic [TLP 6.126–6.1262, and 
Wittgenstein (1984), p. 109]. Giving up the implicit assumption (which is 
shared by both standard and non-standard readings) that any critique of 
rules of inference must take the form of Carroll’s objection opens the 
way for a more charitable and more plausible interpretation of 5.132, ac-
cording to which it is the rules of inference that are being criticized.7 
 
 
II. FREGE’S AND RUSSELL’S CONCEPTIONS OF RULES OF INFERENCE 
 
Frege and Russell insist that the rules that govern their systems are 
not themselves expressions of those systems, and hence that appeals to 
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such rules do not result in adding premises; they thereby escape the Car-
rollian regress. But as I will argue in this section, they continue to expect 
these rules to function in ways that only genuine propositions can func-
tion in, namely to convey substantive content. In inference, according to 
Frege and Russell, otherwise unconnected beliefs are mediated by means 
of recognizing such inexpressible logical content. Wittgenstein, as I un-
derstand him, resolutely rejects the idea that logic is a source of content 
[TLP 5.61] as well as the idea that the realm of content extends beyond 
the limits of language [TLP, p. 26].8 This leads him to reject the idea that 
significant expressions of language are logically unconnected atoms, and 
instead to construe the relation between inference and understanding ho-
listically (as I will show in the next section). It is on this basis that he de-
clares rules of inference to be senseless and superfluous. 
In what sense can Frege and Russell be said to construe rules of in-
ference in terms that involve both inexpressibility and contentfulness? In 
pursuing their logicist projects both Frege and Russell take it as their task 
to make explicit the logical content from which mathematical knowledge 
can to be derived. The inexpressibility of rules of inference counts, from 
this perspective, as a regrettable defect: Russell speaks of it as a “failure 
of the formalism” [Russell (1903), p. 34] and Frege (in a different con-
text) speaks of language as an impediment to the full expression of the 
most fundamental logical distinctions [Frege (1984b), p. 193] which he 
takes to be founded “deep in the nature of things” [Frege (1984a), p. 
156].9 Admittedly, Frege might seem to ascribe no propositional content 
to the rules of inference, since he introduces them separately from the 
axioms of his system; the latter are propositions that state truths of abso-
lutely general scope, and serve as the ultimate grounds of all proofs, 
whereas rules of inference are introduced alongside other rules for the 
use of the symbolism. Like these other rules, Frege says that the rules of 
inference cannot be properly expressed in the symbolism they govern 
without circularity. But in fact, Frege does use special marks to indicate 
which rule of inference is being used in the course of the proof, and 
where, and in this respect rules of inference differ from at least some the 
other rules for signs. For instance, Frege marks the inferential transition 
in modus ponens by means of a horizontal line drawn between the premises 
and the conclusion, and he deploys various other signs to signify other 
kinds of inferential steps, corresponding to each of the rules of his sys-
tem.10 Indeed, for Frege these marks do not officially count as referring 
expressions, which designate (bedeuten) the content of a further thought; 
instead, like the judgment stroke, they are said to merely indicate (an-
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deuten) the manner in which the inference is drawn.11 Frege could there-
fore continue to say, in this attenuated sense, that rules are not expressi-
ble in the notation they govern. But even so, he would not deny that the 
marks of inferential transition register something, namely which premises 
justify the conclusion and by appeal to what rule. 
Moreover, despite their inexpressibility, Frege’s rules are not thought 
of as devoid of content. I here wish to argue against the very common 
tendency to assimilate Frege’s construal of rules to the one found in mod-
ern thinkers such as Carnap and Tarski; even van Heijenoort makes this 
assimilation in saying that Frege’s rules of inference are purely syntactic, 
and are “void of any intuitive logic” [van Heijenoort (1967), p. 326]. 
Admittedly, Frege groups the rules of inference with the rules for the 
formation of expressions of his system. But Frege nonetheless takes the 
rules of inference to encode substantive content. Consider for example 
the way he spells out the relation between the rules and axioms of his 
system: 
 
We have already introduced in the first chapter several principles of 
thought in order to transform them into rules for the application of our 
symbols.  
…In this way, we obtain a small number of laws in which (if we add the 
laws contained in the rules) is included, though in embryonic form, the 
content of all of them. …Perhaps there is yet another series of judgements 
from which (with the addition of those contained in the rules) all the laws of 
thought can be derived. [Frege (1972), p. 136. My emphases] 
 
On Frege’s view, in designing a logical system, we may choose to trans-
form some of the axioms into rules and vice versa. Case in point, where-
as Begriffsschrift employs only one rule and a larger number of axioms, the 
system of Grundgesetze employs three rules of inference and fewer axioms. 
This tradeoff, Frege holds, does not affect the overall content of each of 
the systems, measured by their capacity to form an adequate basis for 
arithmetic [Frege (1972) p. 107, (2013) p. 26]. But it does show that for 
Frege, the content of the logical system resides not only in the axioms 
but also in the rules. So pace van Heijenoort, Frege’s rules of inference, 
though inexpressible in his systems, are meant to convey content. For 
Frege, these rules are thus neither senseless nor superfluous. 
In Principles of Mathematics, Russell argues that the inexpressibility of 
the rules of inference guarantees that Carroll’s regress does not arise 
[Russell (1903), p. 34; cf. Russell (1910), p. 94]. But like Frege, this does 
not prevent him from construing the role of the rules of inference by 
52                                                                                               Gilad Nir  
teorema XL/2, 2021, pp. 45-61 
analogy to that of contentful propositions. Indeed like Frege, Russell 
proposes in Principia that any axiom can be transformed into a rule and 
vice versa [Russell (1910), p. 106]. Moreover, in considering the question 
whether applying a rule of inference requires further justification, Russell 
declares that “the fact that our rule does imply the said implication”, i.e. 
the fact that the inference accords with the rule, is something that must 
be “simply perceived” [Russell (1903), p. 41]. Russell here both speaks of 
rules as something which “implies” other things, and takes inference to 
depend on the appreciation of a further “fact”, beyond those expressed 
by the premises and conclusion. He thus takes the rules to function in 
the way contentful, general truths do — in this sense, Russell’s rules are 
not senseless. At the same time, he treats the propositions to which rules 
apply as inert and disconnected atoms whose relations of implication can 
only be appreciated by means of the further act of applying the rule — in 
this sense, his rules are not superfluous. Wittgenstein’s critique, as I will 
now argue, reflects his rejection of this understanding of the relation be-
tween logical form and the content of thought.  
 
 
III. INFERENCE AND UNDERSTANDING 
 
To fully appreciate Wittgenstein’s critique of Frege’s and Russell’s 
accounts of inference we must consider the alternative he seeks to offer, 
and in particular the way Wittgenstein construes the relation between in-
ference and understanding. To understand a proposition, according to 
Wittgenstein, is to put ourselves in a relation to the way the world is, that 
is, to come to see how the proposition is answerable to the world: “To 
understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true” 
[TLP 4.024]. But for a proposition to be a truth-evaluable claim requires 
that its sense be determinate [TLP 5.156c]; and this means that in under-
standing it we must understand not only what is affirmed, but also what 
is excluded by it [TLP 3.144; cf. Wittgenstein (1984), p. 95 and p. 102]. Ac-
cordingly, to affirm any proposition, at least some of its inferential rela-
tions to other propositions must already be appreciated: for instance, we 
must be able to reject its negation. Logical complexity is in this sense pre-
figured in propositions, including atomic propositions, and is not some 
foreign element that is added on to them, at a second stage [TLP 5.47].12  
This point is captured in Wittgenstein’s claim that propositions oc-
cupy positions in a “logical space” [TLP 3.4]. The relations between 
propositions in this logical space, he holds, are the “scaffolding” which 
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constitutes their sense [TLP 3.42]. But “logical space” is a somewhat 
misleading metaphor, since the logical relations between propositions in 
logical space are not external, but internal relations. Being an internal 
property or relation means that the identity of the object it belongs to is 
constituted by those features: “A property is internal if it is unthinkable 
that its object does not possess it” [TLP 4.123]. Accordingly, the propo-
sition, its location in logical space, and its relations to other locations in 
this space are one and the same thing: 
 
If the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of others, this ex-
presses itself in relations in which the forms of these propositions stand to 
one another…  these relations are internal, and exist as soon as, and by the 
very fact that, the propositions exist. [TLP 5.131] 
 
For Wittgenstein the significant symbol – the sign in use – has priority 
over the merely perceptible aspect of it, the mere sign [TLP 3.326]. The 
logical identity of an expression – what makes various appearances of it 
into appearances of a single symbol – consists in its being used to make 
the same logical contribution in every context [TLP 3.311]. Thus, for ex-
ample, to properly understand a name, to “recognize the symbol in the 
sign”, one must not be misled by ambiguous, but logically distinct uses 
of it; and in the case of properly understanding two synonymous names, 
one must be able to discern the logical relations between sentences in 
which they appear: 
 
Can we understand two names without knowing whether they signify the 
same thing or two different things? Can we understand a proposition in 
which two names occur, without knowing if they mean the same or differ-
ent things? 
If I know the meaning of an English and a synonymous German word, it 
is impossible for me not to know that they are synonymous, it is impossible 
for me not to be able to translate them into one another. [TLP 4.243, my 
emphasis]. 
 
When we have an understanding of a name, Wittgenstein here says, it is 
“impossible” for us not to know whether or not it is logically related to 
other names that we understand. But this is not meant as a substantive 
claim — the necessity at issue is neither a metaphysical nor a psychological 
matter. Rather, Wittgenstein’s point is that behaving otherwise – neglect-
ing to draw the relevant inferences or drawing inferences that conflict with 
such understanding – would reflect a failure to use the sign determinately, 
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i.e. that contrary to our hypothesis, it would not amount to having a prop-
er understanding of the symbol conveyed by that sign. Importantly, inde-
terminacy in our use of signs, which may indeed occur without our 
noticing it, is also the source of what Wittgenstein calls nonsense: an ap-
parently meaningful use of signs that ultimately fails to express anything 
[TLP 5.4733]. The relevance of this point will emerge in a moment.  
As with the understanding of names, a proper understanding of 
propositions is such that she who understands them cannot fail to dis-
cern the logical, internal relations that constitute them. But the sense in 
which it would be “impossible” for her to truly understand propositions 
and yet to behave in ways that conflict with their internal logical relations 
is once again not a substantive one. Rather, it is simply this: given the con-
stitutive role of internal relations in individuating signs as determinate ex-
pressions of significant propositions, it makes no sense to represent any 
thinker as being in such a situation — to assume that she can have a de-
terminate grasp of those propositions and yet not recognize their relations.  
In purporting to represent such a situation as possible we would in-
evitably be equivocating in our own use of the terms “grasp”, “proposi-
tion,” “understand”, “infer”, etc. In other words, it would be we who 
would then be uttering nonsense.13 It is precisely by obscuring this point 
that Carroll makes a mystery of the possibility of inference, and it is by 
dispelling Carroll’s nonsense, rather than by introducing rules of infer-
ence and declaring them to be inexpressible, that Wittgenstein’s Tractatus 
would respond to the apparent regress. Carroll misleads his reader by 
portraying a rational being who putatively understands the premises and 
conclusion of a valid inference, and indeed purports to “accept” the 
premises, while at the same time pretending not to be able to take them 
to form reasons for drawing the conclusion. But such a creature would 
fail to meet the minimal bar below which no understanding (let alone 
“acceptance”) could genuinely be attributed to anyone. Carroll thus 
tempts us to treat as intelligible what is no more than a piece of philo-
sophical nonsense.  
 
 
IV. INFERENCE AND LOGICAL FORM 
 
The interconnectedness of what we understand as competent users 
of a language is not, according to Wittgenstein, some additional content 
that we come to believe or represent. Indeed, Wittgenstein denies that 
logical form is something that can be represented by means of proposi-
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tions, and thereby provide the content for belief; he says that logical 
form shows itself, but cannot be said [TLP 4.1212]. Wittgenstein’s dis-
tinction between saying and showing is notoriously elusive, and this is 
not the place to attempt an interpretation of it. It is clear, however, that 
if we are to make sense of Wittgenstein’s claim that the justification of 
inference depends solely on our understanding of the premises and con-
clusion, and if we are to make sense of his rejection of rules of inference, 
we must avoid assimilating the manner in which for Wittgenstein infer-
ential relations show themselves in propositions but cannot be said by 
them [TLP 4.122] to the manner in which for Frege and Russell inex-
pressible rules justify inferences.  
On the account Wittgenstein rejects, for logical form to show itself 
in inference is for us to grasp what a logical rule would say, were it not 
for the fact that it is inexpressible, and this is assumed to be something 
which stands apart from and is not yet conveyed by the premises and 
conclusions themselves. Indeed, Wittgenstein himself often seems to 
draw dangerously close to affirming this manner of putting things, and 
many of his interpreters have read him in precisely this way.14 Consider, 
for example, the following two passages: 
 
…If two propositions contradict one another, this is shown by their struc-
ture; similarly if one follows from another, etc. [TLP 4.1211] 
 
That the truth of one proposition follows from the truth of other proposi-
tions, we perceive from the structure of the propositions. [TLP 5.13] 
 
As we have seen, Russell, too, speaks of “perceiving” that the rule is ap-
plicable to a given inference, and Frege speaks of inferring in terms of 
being “cognisant” of the support that the truth of the premises provides 
to the conclusion. As I construe Frege’s and Russell’s views, it is sub-
stantive content that they think is thereby being grasped. In what sense, 
then, is Wittgenstein’s use of “perceiving” and “showing” any different? 
In other words, how is his talk of showing to be understood, such that 
his critique of Russell’s and Frege’s accounts of rules in 5.132 could even 
seem to get off the ground? 
Ignoring what Wittgenstein says about the holism of inference and 
understanding, and assuming that propositional signs can be individuated 
independently of the context of significant use, might encourage one to 
take TLP 4.1211 and 5.13 to support the idea that logical form is some-
thing which we perceive separately from our grasp of the propositions, 
and on the basis of which we then ground our inferences. But there is a 
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different way in which Wittgenstein’s claims can be construed: logical 
form and relations of logical structure show themselves in propositions 
insofar as these are truly propositions, that is, insofar as they belong to 
the inferential nexus of the language of a competent speaker. We could 
get a better sense of this by considering TLP 5.1311: 
 
When we conclude from p  q and ∼p to q the relation between the forms 
of the propositions  “p  q” and  “∼p” is here concealed by the method of 
symbolizing. But if we write, e.g. instead of “p  q” “p|q.|.p|q” and instead 
of  “∼p” “p|p” (p|q = neither p nor q), then the inner connexion becomes 
obvious. [TLP 5.1311] 
 
Acquiring mastery of the sheffer-stroke notation renders certain modes 
of inference trivial, which in other notations might seem frustratingly 
complicated. But Wittgenstein does not mean this as a psychological ob-
servation. Rather, what he takes this to illustrate is that all inferences, so 
far as they involve propositions that we actually understand, and regard-
less of the notation in which they are expressed, are just as simple and 
immediate as the transition, in Russell’s notation, from p.q to p.15 Indeed 
in a notation that we do not master, inferences might seem to require an 
appeal to logical rules such as Disjunction Elimination in order to reveal 
the underlying logical connections. But this apparent need for rules of in-
ference is a symptom of our lack of mastery of the specific notation. 
Once we acquire such mastery, we acquire the capacity “to recognize the 
symbol in the sign” [TLP 3.326], and thereby to use that notation as our 
language, and that means, to reason by means of it. It is thus not before 
and apart from, but within the significant use of language – within the 
activities of inferring in a language that we master – that we genuinely 
deal with propositions, rather than mere propositional signs, and it is on-
ly in such context that the logical interrelatedness of propositions can be 
said to show itself. Indeed, what is shown and what does the showing 
within the competent use of language are in a sense one and the same, 
namely the clarity of our thought.16 
A competent user of language is not someone who uses indetermi-
nate signs, but someone who operates with determinate, meaningful 
symbols, whose relations to each other are not obfuscated by the peculi-
arities of the notation. For such a thinker, understanding a proposition is 
not the passive intake of isolated content, which is as inert as a mere 
sign; rather, understanding a proposition consists in acquiring the ability 
to reason with it, informing the entire logical space of the thinker. The 
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ability to infer is constitutive of what this proposition is for the thinker, 
and is what renders her use of the propositional sign determinate, allow-
ing it to convey a symbol.  
If the thinker seems to deviate in her reasoning from what her prior 
understanding dictates, however, that would inevitably also involve her 
failing to use signs in the determinate way she so far has. Importantly, 
her failure would then be located at the level of understanding, not at the 
level of reasoning. This is what Wittgenstein points to when he says that 
“In a certain sense we cannot make mistakes in logic” [TLP 5.473]. For 
what might seem like a mistake in reasoning would reduce, on Wittgen-
stein’s holistic account, to a confusion concerning the logical identity of 
the propositional signs the thinker purports to infer to and from. A 
thinker who takes herself to infer where, by the lights of her own under-
standing, no inference can be made, would therefore be unwittingly ut-
tering nonsense. It is for this reason, too, that appeals to rules of 
inference would be superfluous. Such rules cannot serve to ensure that 
we only infer validly, just as they cannot ensure that we only use our 
signs determinately. Indeed the application of rules presupposes the de-
terminacy of the signs they are meant to apply to. But insofar as our use 
of signs has such determinacy, we already use them in a way that reflects 
their logical form, and hence we already have everything that the rule 





Frege and Russell, I have argued, extend the realm of content be-
yond the realm of expression. I suggested that it is this idea that is target-
ed in 5.132 — the idea that the significant use of language depends on 
the appreciation of logical content which lies beyond the limits of lan-
guage. For Wittgenstein, by contrast, logical form resides in the determi-
nacy of our representation of content; it is not some kind of content that 
we appreciate in addition to what our propositions represent. The rejec-
tion of rules of inference in 5.132 thus marks an important difference be-
tween Wittgenstein and his predecessors: whereas they take the logical 
relations of premises and conclusion to be appreciated by means of the 
application of rules to propositions, Wittgenstein thinks that without the 
appreciation of these logical relations, we do not yet have the proposi-
tions in view, and conversely, that to understand propositions is already 
to appreciate their logical relations. In the opening of this paper I raised 
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the worry that by rejecting the rules of inference Wittgenstein is prevented 
from accounting for the justificatory nature of inferring. But if Wittgen-
stein is correct, there is no need to assume that inferential justification de-
pends on anything beyond the understanding of the propositions involved 
in the inference.   
In assuming that inference requires a mediating act that is separate 
from the acts of affirming the premises and conclusion, Frege and Russell 
treat these propositions as inert atoms; merely understanding each of 
them does not yet entitle us to take any conclusion to be justified.17 This 
is an assumption which Wittgenstein continues to criticize in his later 
work, in denying that propositions are lifeless objects, into which we 
must breathe life by means of further acts, such as the act of applying 
rules to them [Wittgenstein (1969), p. 3]. Since this assumption is still 
widely endorsed, I believe there is much that contemporary philosophers 
can learn from Wittgenstein ’s critique. 
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1 Boghossian (2014) influentially argues that any account of inference must 
conform with what he calls the Taking Condition, namely that “Inferring neces-
sarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion and 
drawing his conclusion because of that fact”. The way I see it, Wittgenstein denies 
that such taking is either an act or a state the inferrer must add to the premises 
and conclusion in order for her inference to be justified.  
2 Evidence for the ambiguity in Russell’s use of the term ‘rule’, ‘law’ and 
‘principle’ is recorded by Proops (2001) and Kremer (2001), p. 67, fn. 17. 
Proops shows that on some occasions Frege, too, fails to uphold a terminologi-
cal distinction between rules and laws. 
3 See Frege (1972), p. 136, Russell (1903), p. 16, p. 35 and p. 41. 
4 There are other passages in the Tractatus that require such a double-
barrelled reading, where Wittgenstein cannot be charitably taken to advance the 
same line of argument against Frege that he does against Russell, e.g. TLP 5.521; 
cf. Diamond (2014), p. 23. 
5 Proops (2001) reads the rejection of Schlussgesetze as targeting the idea, 
which Proops finds both in Frege and in Russell, that the relation of entailment 
between two propositions depends on the axioms. He nonetheless agrees with 
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Ricketts that 5.132 might be taken to pursue two separate targets at once, and 
thus to also target Russell’s rules of inference. 
6 There is a later text from the 1930s in which Wittgenstein motivates the 
conclusions of 5.132 by appeal to a regress argument: “What justifies the infer-
ence is seeing the internal relation. No rule of inference is needed to justify the 
inference, since if it were I would need another rule to justify the rule and that 
would lead to an infinite regress” [Wittgenstein (1982), p. 56]. However, the re-
gress Wittgenstein describes here is different from the one described by Carroll, 
since it involves an endless series of rule-applications rather than an endless series 
of inferences whose number of premises keeps growing. A version of the worry 
that inference might be subject to a regress of rules is addressed by Russell, who 
attributes it to Bradley [Russell (1903) p. 41]. But there is no sign for this in the 
Tractatus. 
7 A further apparent reason to think that ‘Schlussgesetze’ denotes axioms, not 
rules, is the fact that they are rejected not only for being “superfluous” but also for 
being “senseless,” and senselessness is paradigmatically applied, in the Tractatus, to 
logical propositions. But on closer look, the Tractatus sometimes uses the term 
‘senseless’ in a wider sense (e.g. in 5.1362), so this does not follow. On my in-
terpretation, ‘senseless’ in 5.132 is used to point out that contrary to Frege’s and 
Russell’s view, rules could not convey any content. 
8 In this I concur with Diamond 1991b, against readers such as Hacker 
(1986) and Geach (1976).  
9 And see the discussion in Geach (1976).  
10 In Begriffsschrift there is only one rule of inference, and every inference is 
marked by a horizontal line between premises and conclusion [Frege (1972), p. 
119]. Grundgesetze, by contrast, employs three basic rules of inference, each of 
which is marked by a different sign [Frege (2013), p. 22ff.]. 
11 Frege presents the distinction between indicating (andeutende) and referring 
(bedeutende) expressions in discussing the signification of the latin-letter variables 
[Frege (2013), p. 11 and p. 31; see also Frege (1984c), p. 313]. The judgment stroke 
is described as indicating in Frege (1984a), p. 149, fn. 7; the inferential stroke is de-
scribed as indicating in Frege (2013), p. vi and p. 43. Wittgenstein criticizes Frege ’s 
judgment stroke for being logically meaningless [TLP 4.442], and Frege ’s inferential 
signs seem open to similar objections. 
12 Anscombe (1959) lays particular emphasis on this point, which leads her 
to reject the idea that the Tractarian theory of sense has two parts — a picture 
theory for elementary propositions and a truth-functional theory for molecular 
ones. 
13 On this conception of nonsense and on why a failure to determine the 
meaning of signs is not the indication of any substantive impossibility, see Dia-
mond (1991a). 
14 See e.g. Anscombe (1959), Geach (1976) and Hacker (1986). Against 
these, Diamond (1991b) argues that Wittgenstein ’s distinction between saying 
and showing prevents the assimilation of what is shown to what can be said. 
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15 The argument is closely related to the one in TLP 5.441, with which 
Wittgenstein seeks to justify what he calls his Grundgedanke — the thesis that the 
logical constants do not contribute any content to representation [TLP 4.0312]. 
He there argues that the fact that in a different notation we can eliminate some 
of the logical constants in favor of others shows that there is nothing to which 
the constants refer.  
16 For a related construal of the Tractarian notion of showing, see Narboux 
(2014). For the idea that the correlate of showing is not content, but the mastery 
of the language in which content is deployed, see Kremer (2002).  
17 The discussion instigated by Boghossian (2014) seems to me to be 
premised on this assumption; a recent account of inference that avoids making 
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